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Abstract. Certificate status validation is a hard problem in general
but it is particularly complex in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)
because we require solutions to manage both the lack of fixed infras-
tructure inside the MANET and the possible absence of connectivity to
trusted authorities when the certification validation has to be performed.
In this sense, certificate acquisition is usually assumed as an initializa-
tion phase. However, certificate validation is a critical operation since
the node needs to check the validity of certificates in real-time, that is,
when a particular certificate is going to be used. In such MANET envi-
ronments, it may happen that the node is placed in a part of the network
that is disconnected from the source of status data at the moment the
status checking is required. Proposals in the literature suggest the use
of caching mechanisms so that the node itself or a neighbour node has
some status checking material (typically on-line status responses or lists
of revoked certificates). However, to the best of our knowledge the only
criterion to evaluate the cached (obsolete) material is the time. In this
paper, we analyse how to deploy a certificate status checking PKI ser-
vice for hybrid MANET and we propose a new criterion based on risk to
evaluate cached status data that is much more appropriate and absolute
than time because it takes into account the revocation process.
Keywords: Certification, Public Key Infrastructure, Revocation, Hy-
brid MANET, Risk.
1 Introduction
MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) are cooperative networks that al-
low wireless nodes to establish spontaneous communications. As stated
in [1], such networks are envisioned to have dynamic, sometimes rapidly-
changing, random, multi-hop topologies which are likely composed of rel-
atively bandwidth constrained wireless links. MANETs may operate in
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isolation (stand-alone), or they may have gateways to fixed networks. In
this last case, the MANET is called “hybrid”. Hybrid MANETs are ex-
pected to be deployed as an extension to the traditional infrastructure
networks. Also notice that the hybrid behaviour can be temporary due to
the situation in which an ad-hoc network may be sometimes stand-alone
and sometimes connected to the Internet e.g. a subway network in which
a MANET user is connected to the Internet while being at the station
and disconnected while traveling. The Hybrid MANET scenario is the
one considered in this paper.
On the other hand, trust and security are basic requirements to sup-
port business applications in this scenario. The public key scheme is the
preferred underlying mechanism to provide security services. In a public
key scheme, each participant has two keys: a public key (i.e. known by ev-
erybody) and a private key (i.e. secret). The announcement of the public
key is performed using a signed document called Public Key Certificate
(PKC) or simply “certificate“ that binds the participant with her public
key. The entity that signs the certificate is called “certificate issuer” or
“Certification Authority” (CA). In the literature, there are several ways
of managing security and trust in MANETs based on public key cryp-
tography. These approaches basically differ in the degree of decentraliza-
tion of the mechanisms deployed for issuing, publishing and revoking the
certificates (these approaches are reviewed in further detail in the next
section).
In decentralized architectures such as [2] and [3] the nodes inside
the ad-hoc network participate in the certification process. On the other
hand, in the centralized architecture the certification process is fully con-
trolled by an external CA that is a Trusted Third Party (TTP). In this
case the CA digitally signs certificates, ensuring that a particular pub-
lic key belongs to a certain user and the overall certification process is
performed according to a standard and publicly available policy. Each
scheme has its application scenario: decentralized approaches are suitable
for autonomous MANETs or hybrid MANETs that do not require a cen-
tralized enforced certification mechanism while the centralized approach
is suitable for hybrid MANETs in which inter-operability with currently
deployed centralized public key infrastructures (PKIs) is required.
The problem of using a centralized approach is that current PKIs are
designed for wired and well-connected networks, so adopting PKIs for
hybrid MANETs is not an easy task. Mobile users are expected to move
across different networks. When the user is in a network with connection
to the PKI, she can use all the PKI services such as get a certificate,
launch a status query, etc. However, users may be disconnected from
the PKI when they require a real-time PKI service. In this sense, the
certificate status checking is a critical service because applications must
decide, at the time of usage, whether a certificate is acceptable or not to
perform an action. Proposals in the literature suggest the use of caching
mechanisms to let the node itself or a neighbour node to store status
checking material (typically on-line status responses or lists of revoked
certificates). However, to the best of our knowledge the only criterion
to evaluate the cached (obsolete) material is the time. In this paper we
propose and formulate a new criterion based on risk to evaluate cached
status checking data that is much more appropriate and absolute than
time because it takes into account the revocation process. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an analysis of the
main certification approaches for MANET. Section 3 discusses the main
issues that have to be solved in order to adapt current PKI status checking
mechanisms to MANET. In Section 4, we present our proposal to evaluate
cached status data and, finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Certificate Management schemes for MANET
In general, certificate management schemes can be classified as:
– Decentralized. The nodes of the MANET participate either fully or
partially in the certification process (see Figure 1.b).
– Centralized. Authorities outside the MANET control the certification
process according to a global policy (see Figure 1.a).
In the fully decentralized PKI schemes for MANET, like Capkun et al.
[3, 4], the nodes of the MANET themselves issue, publish and revoke the
certificates. The certificate management is autonomous and self-organized
because there is no need for any trusted authority or fixed server and all
the nodes have the same role. In this system, like in PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy) [5], each user is her own issuer. Certificates are stored and dis-
tributed by the nodes in a fully self-organized manner. Each certificate is
issued with a limited validity period and it contains its issuing and expi-
ration times. Before a certificate expires, the owner can issue an updated
version of the certificate, which contains an extended expiration time.
Authors call this updated version the certificate update. Each node peri-
odically issues certificate updates, as long as the owner considers that the
user-key bindings contained in the certificate are correct. Trust is achieved
via chains of certificates. The nodes build trust paths certifying from one
node to another, as in a friendship circle, forming an authentication ring
to achieve the trust relationships with other nodes of the MANET. A
decentralized trust management model for pervasive computing environ-
ments is presented in [6], where authors overcome the challenges posed by
dynamic open environments, making use of the autonomy and cooperative
behaviour of the entities.
Another group of public key schemes for MANET is based on thresh-
old cryptography [2]. The idea behind these schemes is to distribute certi-
fication duties amongst network nodes. A (k, n) threshold scheme allows
the signing private key to be split into n shares such that any k nodes
could combine and recover the signing key for a certain threshold k < n,
whereas k−1 or fewer nodes are unable to do so. In this manner, the sign-
ing key can be partitioned into n shares and distributed to n nodes using
the previous cryptographic technique. For instance, any k of n nodes could
then collaborate to sign and issue valid digital certificates or issue status
data; whereas a coalition of k− 1 or fewer nodes would not be able to do
so. Notice that this scheme is partially decentralized because it requires
an initialization phase in which a centralized authority assigns the role to
the n nodes that will act as servers for certificate management. Partially
decentralized schemes were first proposed by Zhou and Haas in [7]. This
work inspired a practical system called COCA [8] in which a threshold
cryptography scheme is implemented for infrastructure-based networks.
On the other hand, another system called MOCA [9] extends this idea to
ad-hoc networks. In this scheme security is improved by selecting powerful
nodes as Certificate Authority servers.
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Fig. 1. Centralized and decentralized schemes
Finally, an external public key infrastructure can also be used for the
hybrid scenario. In this case, centralized trusted authorities issue, pub-
lish and distribute the status (valid/revoked) of certificates according to
a well-defined standard methodology. In the Internet, the PKIX [10] is
the currently working public key infrastructure. However, PKIX is mostly
designed for wired and well-connected networks and adapting the PKIX
to the hybrid scenario is a challenging task because MANET nodes are
expected to move across different networks, sometimes with on-line con-
nection to the PKIX services and sometimes not. When the user is in
a network with connection to the PKI, she can use all the PKI services
such as getting a certificate, launching a status query, etc. However, users
may be disconnected from the PKIX when they require real-time PKIX
services. We discuss the problem of adapting PKI to MANET in more
detail in the next section.
3 Adapting PKIX to MANET
The local validity of the certificates in the decentralized approaches may
restrict their usability in the hybrid scenario. In this sense, the PKIX
approach is suitable for hybrid MANETs that require support for mobility
maintaining a centralized enforced certification mechanism and also inter-
operability with currently deployed PKIs. However, the original design of
the PKIX assumes that the user can access at any time to the entities
of the infrastructure which is true for wired well-connected networks but
not for our scenario.
The first problem that we have to face is the certificate acquisition.
A permanent connection of the client to the infrastructure cannot be
assumed so the solution is to choose relatively long validity periods for
the certificates. The idea is that the user has to pass an initial certification
process before she can start operating in the MANET. Once the user has
its credential, she can operate in the hybrid scenario without further
interaction with the PKI (at least interaction is not required for a quite
long time). This way of issuing the certificates can be assumed as an
initialization phase equivalent to the initialization phase of the partially
decentralized scheme in which the shares are delivered.
On the other hand, a certificate might be revoked (invalidated) prior to
its expiration. Among other causes, a certificate may be revoked because
of the loss or compromise of the associated private key, in response to
a change in the owner’s access rights, a change in the relationship with
the issuer or as a precaution against cryptanalysis. The revocation policies
determine how the status of the certificates is distributed to the end users.
So the PKI is responsible for the certificates not only at the issuing time
but also during all the certificate’s life-time.
The problem is that PKIX explicit revocation systems were designed
for wired and well-connected networks in which repositories and respon-
ders have a well-known network address and are always available to users.
However, MANETs are dynamic environments in which network topol-
ogy changes randomly and in which mobile users continuously join and
leave the network. Therefore, new mechanisms are necessary to distribute
explicit status data in MANETs. Proposals in the literature suggest the
use of caching mechanisms to address these problems.
Caching schemes allow to manage arbitrary disconnections between
the users and the sources of the status data service. Disconnections are
alleviated by storing copies of status data (lists of revoked certificates
or on-line responses) in the nodes of the ad-hoc network. These copies
are obtained when connection to the infrastructure is available. In gen-
eral, an ad-hoc caching scheme for any service has four different kinds
of nodes [11]: server-nodes, client-nodes, caching-nodes and intermediate-
nodes (see Figure 2). For the status checking service:
– Server-nodes. These nodes have ”always updated data“ to offer the
status checking service. The server-node has a permanent connection
to the certification infrastructure in order to have always fresh status
information. Typically, a server-node is an Access Point connected to
both to a MANET and to the fixed network.
– Client-nodes. These nodes require the status checking service. A ser-
vice discovery mechanism has to be provided to the client so that she
can find a node in the network that provides the service.
– Caching-nodes. These nodes have cached data and therefore they may
also provide the status checking service. A client-node in the absence
of connectivity to a server-node or because of performance issues can
connect with a close caching-node to obtain the service with cached
status data (perhaps quite obsolete data).
– Intermediate-nodes. These nodes forward the packets among client
and server nodes. They may also store the path to a service provider
(whether a server-node or a caching-node) together with service pa-
rameters such as data size, the service expected Time-To-Live (TTL),
number of hops to reach the provider etc.
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In the literature we can find some proposals that apply the previous
ideas to adapt the PKI status checking standards CRL [12, 13] and OCSP
[14] to the MANET. A CRL is a black list with the identifiers of revoked
certificates. The integrity and authenticity of the CRL is provided by
an appended digital signature. On the other hand, OCSP is a protocol
to make the status of certificates available through a request/response
mechanism. The OCSP server is called responder and provides signed
responses to clients. Next, we give our point of view about this adaptation
and we briefly review some remarkable works about this in the literature.
In the case of CRL, server-nodes are nodes that can maintain a stable
connection to PKI repositories in order to get the most updated CRL.
A caching-node is a node that is willing to collaborate in the certificate
status checking service and that has enough cache capacity to store a CRL
copy. The caching-node responds to the status requests of client-nodes in
the MANET. Notice that a client-node that acquires a valid CRL copy
can become a new caching-node. Furthermore, a caching-node that moves
to another MANET can collaborate in the new network to provide the
service. In this sense, user’s mobility helps the status checking service. In
[15], the authors investigate the feasibility of using flooding to distribute
CRL information in MANETs by simulation. They conclude that the two
major factors for flooding to work smoothly are the number of nodes and
the communication range. In [16] a MANET cooperative mechanism for
certificate validation is presented in order to overcome both the lack of
infrastructure and the limited capabilities of the nodes. This solution is
based on an extended-CRL where the repositories can build an efficient
structure through an authenticated hash tree.
Regarding OCSP, server-nodes are responders. We can consider that
there are only responders placed in the PKI (fixed-responders) or we can
consider the possibility of having responders implemented in a mobile
node that can be part of a MANET (mobile-responders). Despite this
possibility, we discourage the use of mobile-responders because they are
server-nodes and as such they are supposed to have updated status data.
A server-node for certificate status checking must have connectivity with
PKI repositories or fixed-responders to get updated status data but this
connectivity is not always guaranteed in a MANET. On the other hand, a
responder is a trusted authority so it has a private key that has to protect
against intruders. In our view, it makes no sense having a server-node that
is exposed to attacks and that may not have useful data. Furthermore, in
general, increasing the number of trusted authorities in a system is not
desirable, the less number of trusted authorities, the less is the probability
of having a private key compromised. Besides, if mobile-responders are
used, it is necessary to define a mechanism to trust them which is not
trivial. With respect caching-nodes, they store OCSP responses issued
by server-nodes and distribute them to client-nodes when they detect a
request that fulfils freshness requirements. In [17, 18], there is a complete
proposal called ADOPT (Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust) that de-
scribes a caching scheme for OCSP in MANET.
4 Evaluation of cached status data based on Risk
As explained in the previous section, caching and discovery mechanisms
are necessary to manage the situation in which a user is not able to reach
a PKI status data server. When a disconnection happens, the client-node
uses service discovery to find a caching node. Then, the node obtains a
cached version of available status data and finally, the node decides what
to do with the data. In this sense, the CA issues status data bounded by
two time-stamps:
– thisUpdate. Instant at which status data have been issued.
– nextUpdate. Instant at which updated status data are expected to be
issued.
Let us define Ts as the issuing interval of status data (1).
Ts = nextUpdate− thisUpdate (1)
As data in status responses are time-stamped, users can get an idea
about how fresh is the status of a certificate by looking at the thisUpdate
parameter of the response and, finally a user can take a decision about
whether operate or not with a certain certificate. According to [19] the
time is the only criterion to help the user to take this decision and to the
best of our knowledge this is the only criterion proposed in the literature.
However, this is a poor criterion that can be enhanced. In this section,
we propose other parameter rather than time to take this decision.
First of all, let us illustrate why time is a poor parameter for our pur-
poses. For instance, consider a status response issued a couple of hours
ago. We may wonder: is it fresh or not? The answer is obviously that ”it
depends“. Two hours may not be considered a long time if there are a cou-
ple of revoked certificates every month but this period can be considered
quite long if there are two new revoked certificates per hour. Moreover,
a scenario with millions of issued non-expired certificates is not the same
as a scenario that has hundreds of certificates. In the former, a couple of
new revoked certificates is not so relevant while in the latter a couple of
new revocations is quite important. As a conclusion, we need a parameter
that considers all these aspects. For this purpose, we define a risk func-
tion that aids the user to decide whether to trust or not a certificate. We
formally define the function risk (r(t)) as the probability of considering a
certificate as a valid one when the real status known by the PKI is revoked
at time t.
To find an analytical expression for the risk function we first need
to analyse the certificate issuing process. Certificates are issued with a
validity period Tc. Obviously Tc >> Ts, for instance Tc can be a year
while the period of status data issuing can be an hour. The number of non-
expired certificates (N(t)) -including revoked and non revoked certificates-
is a stochastic process whose mean value at instant t depends on the
certificate issue and certificate expiration processes. It is assumed that the
elapsed time since issuing until expiration (Tc) is a constant value for all
certificates. Therefore, the expiration process is the same as the issuance
process elapsed Tc time units. This process is defined by the certificate
issue rate λc, which matches with the certificate expiration rate. Hence
the mean value of non-expired certificates in steady state is the mean
quantity of issued certificates before the expiration process begins.
E[N(t)] = N = λCTC , t > TC (2)
On the other hand, there is a group of revoked non-expired certificates,
that is to say, certificates that have a valid validity period but that have
been revoked prior to the expiration date and, therefore they are included
in the black list. The subset of revoked non-expired certificates is included
in the set of non-expired certificates and the cardinality of that set, R(t),
is a stochastic process that it is typically modelled [20] as a fraction or
percentage (p(t)) of the non-expired certificates (3).
R(t) = p(t)N(t) with p(t) ≤ 1 (3)
Assuming that both processes are independent and using expected
values:
E[R(t)] = E[p(t)]E[N(t)] (4)
R = pN (5)
We further model the expected percentage of revoked certificates as
directly proportional to the certification time Tc (6).
p = p′Tc (6)
This means that larger certification periods will imply more percent-
age of revoked certificates. On the other hand, smaller certification periods
mean less probability of a certificate being revoked during its life-time and
therefore low percentage of revoked certificates. Then, the mean value of
the revoked non-expired certificates can be expressed as:
R = p′λcT 2c (7)
We have modelled the issuing and revoking processes of the overall
system. However, our goal is to model the risk from the point of view
of the user, that is to say, we want to find the probability of considering
a certificate as a valid one when the real status known by the PKI is
revoked.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that at instant t0 = thisUpdate
a user gets the current black list of revoked certificates from the PKI. Us-
ing this list, the user can split the set of non-expired certificates into
revoked certificates and not revoked certificates.
Next, we need to define the subset of operative certificates as the
group of non-expired certificates for which the last status known by a
user is not revoked. Notice that the PKI may know that a certificate
considered operative by a user is in fact revoked. However, due to the
MANET conditions it is impossible to communicate this situation to the
user.
Now, let us assume that the user is not able to connect to the infras-
tructure any more. As time goes by the set of operative certificates will
include revoked certificates and the user will need to take decisions about
using an operative certificate assuming a certain risk. The risk function
r(t) can be evaluated as the ratio between the number of unknown re-
voked operative certificates (R′(t)) and the number of operative certificates
(N ′(t)) as shown in equation (8).
r(t) =
E[R′(t)]
E[N ′(t)]
(8)
N ′(t) (number of operative certificates) can be defined as the number
of certificates that were not included in the last black list obtained by the
user (were not revoked before t0) and that they have not expired at t.
Included in the set of operative certificates there is the subset of unknown
revoked operative certificates. The cardinality of this subset R′(t) is the
number of operative certificates that are revoked at instant t, that is, they
are revoked but this fact is unknown to the user.
At t0 = thisUpdate the set of operative certificates is the same that the
set of not revoked certificates and, since the user has the same information
that the PKI so there is no risk (r(t0) = 0). Besides
E[N ′(t0)] = (1− p)N (9)
E[R′(t0)] = 0 (10)
At the instant t0+TC all the certificates included in the black list will
be expired. This means that all non expired certificates will be operative,
and any revoked certificate will be unknown to the user. The risk at this
moment can be expressed as (11).
r(t0 + TC) =
E[R′(t0 + TC)]
E[N ′(t0 + TC)]
=
E[R(t0)]
E[N(t0)]
= p (11)
To evaluate the function risk between t0 and t0+TC we have to observe
the processes N ′(t) and R′(t) in this interval. After t0 the variation of the
number of operative certificates (N ′(t)) depends on these factors:
– Increases because of the new issues.
– Decreases because of the expiration of operative certificates issued
before instant t0 (the certificates issued later do not expire in the
considered interval).
The issuance rate is λc that is the same as the expiration rate. But
notice that not all expirations concern to operative certificates. A fraction
p of the expirations corresponds to revoked non expired certificates, and
the other fraction 1 − p corresponds to operative certificates. Then the
expiration rate of operative certificates is (1− p)λc (see Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Evolution of operative certificates
Considering the evolution of the set of operative certificates we can
evaluate its expected cardinal (12).
E[N ′(t)] = E[N ′(t0)] + λC(t− t0)− (1− p)λC(t− t0) (12)
Using (9) we obtain.
E[N ′(t)] = (1− p)N + pλC(t− t0) (13)
Finally, we need an expression for the set of revoked operative certifi-
cates. This set is the intersection of the set of operative certificates and
the set of revoked certificates as shown in the Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Sets of certificates
Hence we can express the cardinality of these sets using the following
expression.
N(t) = R(t) +N ′(t)−R′(t) (14)
Therefore,
R′(t) = R(t) +N ′(t)−N(t) (15)
We obtain the expected value of the number of revoked operative
certificates using (15), (2), (5) and (13).
E[R′(t)] = pλC(t− t0) (16)
To obtain the risk function we use the expressions (13), (16) and the
expression of its definition (8).
r(t) =
p(t− t0)
(1− p)Tc + p(t− t0) (17)
The previous expression is valid for instants of time t  t0 ≤ t ≤
t0 + Tc and fulfils with the expected results of expressions (10) and (11).
Notice that the risk function allows a user to compute the probability of
considering a non-expired certificate as non-revoked when the real status
known by the PKI is revoked.
On the other hand, it is remarkable that unlike time which is a rela-
tive parameter, the risk function gives the user an absolute parameter to
aid her taking the decision of trusting or not a particular certificate. This
decision must be taken when the user is disconnected from the infrastruc-
ture and therefore it is taking into consideration cached (obsolete) status
data.
Finally, the risk function should be used as follows:
– In first place, the CA signs the status data with the two standard
time-stamps (thisUpdate and nextUpdate) but it also adds the current
parameter p. The CA can calculate this parameter because it knows
the current number of issued non-expired certificates and the current
number of non-expired revoked certificates.
– When the user has to evaluate status data, she knows Tc as this is the
certification period included in her certificate.
– Then, the user obtains p from the status data.
– Next, the user can compute the risk at current time t by replacing t0
with thisUpdate in the risk function.
– Finally, the user can take a decision about a target certificate with
the risk value computed.
5 Conclusions
Decentralized certification architectures for MANET such as self-organized
PKIs and PKIs based on threshold cryptography generally provide certifi-
cate validation mechanisms inside the MANET. However, local validity
of the certificates and inter-operability with currently deployed PKIs may
restrict their usability in an hybrid MANET scenario. If a centralized cer-
tification infrastructure such as PKIX is used, then certificate validation
becomes one of the main problems. This is because users need to ensure at
the time of usage that the certificate they are relying upon has not been
revoked but at the same time trusted servers of PKIX may be unavail-
able. Besides, standard status checking mechanisms of the fixed network
are not directly usable because they are designed for always connected
users.
In this sense, caching schemes allow to manage arbitrary disconnec-
tions between the users and the sources of the status data service. Discon-
nections are alleviated by storing copies of status data (lists of revoked
certificates or on-line responses) in the nodes of the ad-hoc network. These
copies are obtained when connection to the infrastructure is available. On
the other hand, a service discovery mechanism is necessary to find the
nodes that have cached material. In this paper, we have reviewed and
analysed all these issues for adapting the standard PKIX status checking
mechanisms to hybrid MANET.
Despite the caching scheme allows the users to obtain status data dur-
ing disconnections, the cached status data is likely to be outdated. When
using cached status data a node could operate with a revoked certificate
considering it is a valid one. In this paper, we have presented a novel
scheme which provides users within the MANET with an absolute crite-
rion to determine whether to use or not a target certificate when updated
status data is not available. By taking into account information about the
revocation process, users can calculate a risk function in order to estimate
whether a certificate has been revoked while there is no connection to a
status checking server. Finally, it is also worth to mention that this new
criterion can be applied to other networks than hybrid MANETs if these
networks are based on an off-line explicit revocation scheme.
Abbreviations
ADOPT Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust.
CA Certification Authority.
COCA Cornell On-line Certification Authority.
CRL Certificate Revocation List.
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network.
MOCA Mobile Certificate Authority.
OCSP On-line Certificate Status Protocol.
PGP Pretty Good Privacy.
PKI Public Key Infrastructure.
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure (X.509).
TTL Time-To-Live.
TTP Trusted Third Party.
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